BANKRUPTCY-EXCUSABLE

NEGLECT-CONSIDERATION OF EQUITA-

BLE FACTORS Is PERMITTED FOR LATE CHAPTER 11 PROOF OF

CLAIM FILINGS UNDER BANKRUPTCY RULE 9006(B) (1) TO DETERMINE IF FILER'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED EXCUSABLE NEGLECT-

PioneerInv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
A Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition grants business debtors the
opportunity to overcome financial problems with court assistance.1
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) 2 operates under
the premise that the economy is better served by rebuilding a company rather than selling off the company's components.' Under
1 Richard Lieb & Robert J. Feinstein, LBO Litigation, FinancialProjections And The
Chapter 11 Plan Process, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 598, 600 (1991). Under Chapter 11,
business debtors are rehabilitated through a reorganization of operations. Id. Chapter 11 reorganizations allow the debtor to continue business operations so that creditors receive optimum repayment. Id. at 599. Bankruptcy serves multiple purposes
depending on different perspectives. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CH.
L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1987). From a debtor's perspective, bankruptcy serves to organize defaults and prescribes distribution procedures. Id. at 777. From a creditor's perspective, however, business bankruptcies facilitate and define respective collection
rights. Id.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Code's present form derives from: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1992)) amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-454, 98 Stat.
1745 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, And Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (1988); Criminal
Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. .101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (1990).
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code covers business reorganizations, as opposed
to Chapter 7, where a trustee liquidates the debtor's assets and then distributes the
proceeds to creditors, and Chapter 13, where individuals with regular income are
granted an extended repayment schedule. RicHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS
UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCV CODE § 1.02 (1993).
The goals of bankruptcy for Chapters 7, 11, and 13 are similar and include:
equal access for creditors and debtors to the bankruptcy procedure, equitable and
fair treatment of creditor's claims, and rehabilitation of the debtor. See H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, 75-82 (1973); see also Thomas H. Jackson & Robert
E. Scott, On The Nature OfBankruptcy: An Essay On Bankruptcy SharingAnd The Creditor's
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 155 (1989) (reciting the "two normative objectives of
bankruptcy: rehabilitation of overburdened debtors and equality of treatment for
creditors and other claimants"). See generaUy RicHARD I. AARON, BANKruTrcv LAw FUNDAMENTALS, § 1.01 (9th ed. 1990) (discussing the history and importance of American
bankruptcy jurisprudence).
3 The Honorable Stephen A. Stripp, Balancingof Interests in Orders Authorizing the
Use of Cash Collateralin Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 562, 564 (1991). Chapter 11
assumes that the "going concern value" of a business's assets is worth more than the
total that would be received from a sale of the assets. Id. "Going concern value" is
defined as "[t]he value of the assets of a business as an operating, active concern,
rather than merely as items of property (book value of assets alone) which would be
the case in a liquidation sale." BLACK'S LAW DiCToNARY 691 (6th ed. 1990). Chapter
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Chapter 11, a reorganization plan provides the vehicle for a debtor
company's economic revitalization.'
Along the path to solvency, creditors are permitted to control
and protect their interests.5 Before the reorganization scheme begins, the bankruptcy filer and each creditor must define their con11 prevents the unnecessary losses that are usually incurred by both debtors and creditors in a forced sale of assets. Stripp, supra, at 564-65. The United States legislature,
in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, contemplated that assets built for a particular industry should be used for their purpose rather than sold. Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1043 (1992). Further, because reorganizations reduce job losses and stabilize the economy, public policy favors the Chapter 11 procedure. Id. at 1043-44.
4 AARON, supra note 2, at § 1.04. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor and a
majority of the creditors agree upon an out-of-court reorganization plan. 124 CONG.
REc. H32,405 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. D. Edwards) [hereinafter
Edwards Statement]. The reorganization plan may contain solutions ranging from issuing new equity claims on behalf of the creditor to arranging the debts for repayment.
Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (1992). The reorganization plan groups creditors
according to their existing claims and details a repayment schedule. Id. at 94. Upon
completion, the debtor submits the plan to the creditors for their confirmation. Edwards Statement, supra, at H32,405. Early confirmation of this plan reduces expenses
by lowering administrative costs, promoting prompt distribution, and allowing businesses to operate normally. Id.
Aside from the submission and approval of the reorganization plan, debtors and
creditors confront many decisions. Frost, supra,at 90. For instance, debtors and creditors may need to decide whether to finance future business operations, how to handle existing contracts that include the business, and whether any asset sales are
required before reorganization. Id. The formulation of the plan, however, along with
its confirmation, comprises the major hurdle of the entire Chapter 11 proceeding.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 and 13 Cases, 75
CAL. L. REv. 391, 391 (1987).
5 AARON, supra note 2, at § 1.04. A statutory creditors committee works with the
debtor and monitors the management of the business during the reorganization. 11
U.S.C. § 1103 (1988). Section 1103 provides:
A committee ... may(1) consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the
administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the
desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any
plan formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner ... ; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those
represented.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)-(5). The creditors committee monitors the actions of Chapter
11 debtors and protects creditors' interests. AARON, supra note 2, § 1.04 at 27.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1058

[Vol. 24:1056

tested claims.6 The Code requires the debtor to include a creditor
listing with its bankruptcy petition.7 Creditors may subsequently
establish their interests by filing proofs of claim.8 The court then
sets a claims bar date that represents the final day for filing such
proofs. 9

Although the Code mainly assists debtors,10 Bankruptcy Rule
6 See generally Peter A. Knocke, Filing Proofs of Claim in Bankruptcy, FLA. BJ., Feb.
1988, at 15, 15-18 (outlining the general procedures for bankruptcy claim filings).
Any creditor of a Chapter 11 debtor can file a proof of claim. Id. at 16. Such filing
may be accomplished by providing a written notice of claim to the bankruptcy trustee.
Id. Official forms are available to file claims, but claims may be filed in any fashion so
long as the proof is in writing and substantially conforms to Official Form No. 19. Id.
at 16-17.
Creditors' attorneys should always assume that proofs of claims need to be filed
to preserve a creditor's rights to assets, even though some claims do not require
proofs. Id. at 15. As a result, creditors' attorneys should be aware that their client
usually receives the first bankruptcy notices from the court. Id. These initial notices
set the date for creditors' meetings and may contain the final date for filing proofs of
claim. Id.
7 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1988). The Code provides, in pertinent part, that a debtor
shall "file a list of creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets
and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs." Id. Furthermore, a list of the twenty largest
unsecured creditors should accompany a bankruptcy petition. 6A COLLIER ON BANK.
Ruprcy XI-6 (15th ed. 1993) [hereinafter COLLIER]. Unsecured creditors are those
creditors holding debts that are defined as "[d ] ebt obligations that are not backed by
pledged collateral or security agreement." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1539 (6th ed.
1990). Official Bankruptcy Form 4 outlines the relevant information that a debtor
must provide for each creditor. COLLIER, supra, at XI-21.
8 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988). A "claim" is defined as a "[flight to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (A) (1988). A claim is deemed filed under § 501
unless the debtor lists it as "disputed, contingent, or unliquidated." 11 U.S.C. § 1111
(1978). Attorneys are advised to file proofs of claim to ensure participation in any
reorganization scheme. Knocke, supra note 6, at 15.
9 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c) (3). Rule 3003(c) (3) provides: "The court shall fix
and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may
be filed." Id.
10 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States recognized that
the objective of the legislation was "to relieve the honest but unfortunate debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness...." Letter from Harold Marsh,Jr., Chairman
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, to The President,
The Chief Justice of the United States, and The Congress, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (1973); see also Lieb & Feinstein, supranote 1, at 598
(asserting that "Congress and the courts have traditionally shaped the bankruptcy law
to provide a 'fresh start' for honest debtors who suffer financial reverses in their business or personal affairs"). Two commentators declared, however, that Chapter 11, as
presently constructed, has become a self-imposed tool utilized by corporate managers
for profit. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1049-50. Bradley and Rosenzweig
argued that, as a result, stockholders and bondholders lose more wealth in Chapter
11 than under the previous bankruptcy rules. Id. at 1049. The commentators also
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9006(b)(1) (Rule 9006(b)(1)) provides creditors some latitude
when filing these claims.1" Under Rule 9006(b) (1), creditors may
file proofs of claim after the claims bar date if the court determines
that the delay resulted from "excusable neglect."1 2 Although Rule
9006(b) (1) was intended to provide leeway for tardy creditors, the
excusable neglect provision exemplifies one of the Code's

vagaries.1
Recently, in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates,"
the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit court dispute
concerning excusable neglect by adopting a liberal reading of the
pointed out that bankruptcy filings no longer necessarily coincide with weak economic conditions. Id. Chapter 11 benefits corporate debtors to such a great extent,
Bradley and Rosenzweig concluded, that the reorganization section of the Bankruptcy
Code should be repealed. Id. at 1050.
P. 9006(b)(1). Rule 9006(b)(1) provides:
11 FED. R. BMNKR.
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when
an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period
by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure
to act was the result of excusable neglect
Id. (emphasis added). Rule 9006(b)(1) was enacted to authorize courts to utilize discretion when considering granting time extensions for acts ordered by the court or
the bankruptcy rules. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1) advisory committee's note. Rules
9006(b)(2) and 9006(b)(3) provide the exceptions to the court's authority when
granting time extensions. Id. Rules 9006(b) (2) and 9006(b) (3) provide:
(2) Enlargement Not Permitted. The court may not enlarge the time for
taking action under Rule 1007(d), 1017(b)(3), 1019(2), 2003(a) and
(d), 7052, 9015(f), 9023, and 9024.
(3) EnlargementLimited. The court may enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1006(b) (2), 3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c), 8002,
and 9033, only to the extent and under the conditions stated in those
rules.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2)-(3).
12 FED. R. BANKR. R. 3003(c)(3), 9006(b)(1). See supra note 9 (providing the text of
Rule 3003(c) (3)); supra note 11 (detailing the excusable neglect provision of Rule
9006(b) (1)). In this Note, "excusable neglect," unless otherwise provided, refers to
that which is specified in the section of 9006(b) (1) quoted above.
13 See AARON, supra note 2, at § 1.04 (asserting that "[a] reading of the statute conveys repeated opportunities for complicated litigation with vague and unknowable
standards"). To alleviate confusion, the Code is supplemented by local bankruptcy
rules. Howard A. Patrick & Michael L. Meyer, An Overview Of The Bankruptcy Reform
Act Of 1978, 1 B.R. 1, 51 (West 1980). The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey, for example, promulgated local rules concerning bankruptcy
procedure. See N.J. BANKR. CT. R. 1 to 13-2. These local rules include provisions concerning Admission of Attorneys (Rule 1), Discovery (Rule 5), Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (Rule 11-3), and Chapter 11 Claims (Rule 11-8). Id.
14 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
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term.15 The Court also outlined the proper factual considerations
for delayed proofs of claim filings.16 In addition to the late filer's
contribution to the delay, the Pioneer Court ruled, excusable17 neglect considerations should include several equitable factors.
In Pioneer,the debtor, Pioneer Investment Services (Pioneer or
debtor), filed its petition and a list of its twenty largest unsecured
creditors on April 12, 1989.18 The next day, the court mailed these
creditors a letter scheduling a meeting, as required under Code
§ 341,19 for May 5, of the same year.20 The meeting notice also set
15 Id. at 1494 n.3, 1496, 1498. The Court recognized that the Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits strictly construed the excusable neglect element of Rule
9006(b) (1). Id. at 1494 n.3 (citing In reDavis, 936 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1991); In re
Danielson, 981 F.2d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1992); Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota,
N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Analytical Sys. Inc., 933 F.2d 939,
942 (11th Cir. 1991)). The Pioneermajority explained that the strict application denied relief if the reason for the delay was within the reasonable control of the party
filing the motion. Id. at 1500; see, e.g., In re Davis, 936 F.2d at 774 (holding that a
debtor would not be granted an excusable neglect extension because of uncertainty
concerning whether a third party had already filed a proof of claim). For a discussion
of Davis, see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
Conversely, the PioneerCourt noted that the Tenth Circuit implemented a liberal
construction of the term "excusable neglect." Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1494 n.3 (citing In
re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Trustees of
the Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp., 111 S. Ct. 145
(1990)). The liberal excusable neglect interpretation, the Supreme Court observed,
contemplated a broad range of factors beyond the late filer's culpability. Id. at 1496;
see also infra note 37 and accompanying text (detailing the Ninth Circuit's application
of liberal factors in In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988)).
16 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1498. The Court directed that a party's delay must be
judged in terms of "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant
acted in good faith." Id. (citation omitted).
17 Id. The majority concluded that the excusable neglect analysis ultimately rested
on these equitable principles. Id.
18 Id. at 1492. See supra note 7 (outlining the Code provisions regarding creditor
listings in bankruptcy claim filings). Pioneer Investment Services voluntarily filed for
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization on April 12, 1989. Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1492.
Four unsecured creditors filed a Rule 9006(b)(1) motion for an extension to file a
proof of claim. In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 106 B.R. 510, 511 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1989), appealdismissed, 902 F.2d 32 (1990), rev'd, In re Pioneer Inv. Servs., 943 F.2d 673
(6th Cir. 1991), affld, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993). These creditors included Clinton Associates Limited Partnership, West Knoxville Associates Limited Partnership, Brunswick
Associates Limited Partnership, and Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited Partnership.
Id. Together, these associations constituted the unsecured creditors of Pioneer Investment Services. Id.
19 Section 341(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Within a reasonable time after the
order for relief in a case under this title, [11 U.S.C.S. §§ 101 et seq.,] the United States
trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of the creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 341
(1988).
20 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 512.
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a claims bar date of August 3, 1989.21
Marc A. Berlin received the notice and attended the § 341
meeting on the creditors' behalf.2 2 In mid-June, after Berlin became a member of the United States Trustee's unsecured creditors' committee,23 the creditors retained attorney Marc Richards to
represent them throughout the proceeding. 24 Even though Berlin
forwarded Richards the entire bankruptcy file, which contained
the letter denoting the claims deadline, Richards, when questioned
by the creditors, responded that he was unaware of the August 3
deadline. 21 On July 31, 1989, Richards left his law firm and neglected to review the bankruptcy file until mid-August. 26 Amidst
this confusion, the claims bar date passed, and the creditors failed
to file proofs of claims until August 23, 1989.27
The creditors included a Rule 9006(b) (1) bar date extension

motion along with their tardy proofs of claims. 8 Utilizing a strict
excusable neglect interpretation under Rule 9006(b) (1),29 the

21 Id. The notice stated: "You must file a proof of claim if your claim is scheduled
as disputed, contingent or unliquidated, is unlisted or you do not agree with the
amount. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1111 & Bankruptcy Rule 3003. Bar date is August 3,
1989." Id. The claims bar date is the final day on which a creditor may file a proof of
claim. See FED. R. BANxR. P. 3003(c) (1), (3); see also supra note 9 (detailing the provisions of Rule 3003(c) (3)).
22 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 512. Berlin was president of Robriste Enterprises, Inc. and
Pudding Enterprises, Inc. Id. He also served as the general partner for West Knoxville
Associates, Clinton Associates, Ft. Oglethorpe Associates, and Brunswick Associates,
the unsecured creditors in Pioneerwho were seeking an extension for filing proofs of
claim. Id.
23 In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1991), afid, 113 S. Ct.
1489 (1993). See supra note 5 (detailing the responsibilities of the creditor's committee under 11 U.S.C. § 1103).
24 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 513. Richards had practiced bankruptcy for over seven years
and was involved in multiple bankruptcies around the country including those of
Baldwin-United, LTV, Braniff Airlines, Tacoma Boat Building, Family Health Plans,
DRW Realty, Wilson Foods, and Spector Red Ball. Id. at 513 n.5.
25 Id. at 513. Berlin testified that, when he gave Richards the bankruptcy file, he
asked Richards whether any bar date was set, and Richards incorrectly replied that no
urgency was required because no deadline existed. Id.
26 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1492-93 (citation omitted). Richards asserted that his temporary absence caused a significant and major disruption in his life throughout the
month of August, 1989. Id. at 1492.
27 Id.
28 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 511.

The creditors also filed a motion to allow the claim
filing nunc pro tunc. Id. Nunc pro tunc is defined as "an entry made now of something
actually previously done to have effect of former date." BLAcK's LAW DICtiONARY 1069
(6th ed. 1990).
29 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 516-17. Noting the absence of an excusable neglect standard
in its circuit, the bankruptcy court expressed agreement with the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits' holdings on the subject. Id. at 516; see supra note 15 (summarizing
the debate among the circuit courts on the applicable standard for excusable neglect
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bankruptcy court denied the creditors' motion for an extension. 0
The strict standard, the court maintained, required that the circumstances producing delay be beyond the reasonable control of
the responsible filer."1 Noting Richards's and Berlin's attendance
at creditors' meetings from mid-June onward and their respective
concluded that the delay was within the
legal experience, the court
2
creditors.1
the
of
control
On appeal, the district court remanded, questioning the bankruptcy court's strict excusable neglect interpretation."3 The district
court anticipated a more liberal approach by the Sixth Circuit 4
and instructed the bankruptcy court to re-examine the facts under
the Ninth Circuit's In re Dix35 analysis.3 6 The Dix test, the court
observed, considered not only whether the delay was within the
filer's control, but added: (1) whether the delay prejudiced the
debtor; (2) whether the delay impacted upon the court calendar;
(3) whether the creditor exhibited good faith; and (4) whether the
counsel's neglect should prejudice the creditors.3 7 Furthermore,
the district court directed the bankruptcy court to determine
under Rule 9006(b) (1)). Accordingly, the court established that a late filer could
claim excusable neglect only if "'failure to timely perform a duty was due to circumstances beyond [the filer's] reasonable control.'" Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1493 (quotation
omitted).
30 Pioneer,106 B.R. at 517. The bankruptcy court disposed of this motion, refusing
to consider any of the circumstances surrounding the late filing under Rule
9006(b)(1). Id. at 516, 517.
31 Id. at 514, 516. For examples of this standard's application, see In re Underground Utility Constr. Co., 35 B.R. 588, 588, 589 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that
mailing a proof of claim to the incorrect address that caused a deadline to be missed
by three days did not constitute excusable neglect); In re Oakton Beach & Tennis
Club Real Estate Ltd., 9 B.R. 201, 202, 205 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that
creditor's counsel who relied upon misinformation from a court clerk regarding a
proof of claim filing failed to establish excusable neglect); In re Horn Constr. & Maintenance, Inc., 32 B.R. 87, 88, 89 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1983) (concluding that faulty communication between a creditor and its bankruptcy attorney, which caused tardy claim
filing, created a situation undeserving of an excusable neglect extension).
32 Pioneer, 106 B.R. at 515-16.
33 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1493.
34 Id.
35 95 B.R. 134 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988). In Dix, the Ninth Circuit allowed a Rule
9006(b) (1) excusable neglect extension to a creditor who was unaware of his claim
due to a business relationship between the debtor and creditor involving multiple
transactions. Id. at 136, 139. The Dix court concluded that excusable neglect, for Rule
9006(b) (1) purposes, should be liberally applied to the facts of each case. Id. at 138.
Accordingly, the Dix court considered the equities of the late filing, which revealed no
prejudicial effects to the debtor or to court administration. Id. For a full discussion
of Dix, see infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
36 Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1493.
37 Id. (quoting Dix, 95 B.R. at 138 (quoting In re Magouirk, 693 F.2d 948, 951 (9th
Cir. 1982))).
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whether the actions of the late filing creditors or their counsel
could be labelled negligent, indifferent, or culpable. 8
Saddled with two standards, the bankruptcy court again dismissed the motion. 9 Applying the Dix analysis, the court concluded that the attorney's error prompted the delay, and that the
attorney's mistakes should burden the creditors.4 ° Accordingly, the
court held that a filing extension was inappropriate.4 1 The court
strengthened its decision by finding that the attorney's indifference towards the deadline constituted negligence.4 2 On appeal,
the district court affirmed.4"
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed." First,
the Sixth Circuit held that the liberal Dix factors utilized by the
bankruptcy court were not comprehensive.4 5 The court of appeals
remarked that the suggested considerations should be molded to
the facts of each case. 46 Second, the appeals court disagreed with
the bankruptcy court's assertion that the creditors deserved punishment for their counsel's mistakes.47 Specifically, the court emphasized that when the creditors asked Richards for the claims bar
38 Id. Specifically, the district court directed the bankruptcy court to consider
"whether the failure to comply with the bar date 'resulted from negligence, indifference or culpable conduct on the part of a moving creditor or its counsel.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
39 Id.
40 Id.

The bankruptcy court concluded that the cause for the delay was within the
creditor's control. Id. Further, the court declared that it would be proper to penalize
the creditors for the acts of their counsel because the creditor's initial representative,
Berlin, was a sophisticated businessman and had actual knowledge of the bar date.
Id.; see In re Pioneer, 106 B.R. 510, 512 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (noting that
Berlin not only conducted business in financial management and real estate, but was
admitted to practice law in New York and Florida, and was also a certified public
accountant). As a result, the bankruptcy court found that two of the Dix factors
weighed against the creditors. Pioneer, 113 S.Ct. at 1493. The bankruptcy court conceded, however, that the late filings would not prejudice Pioneer, that the 20-day
filing delay would not hamper judicial efficiency, and that the creditors and their
attorney exhibited good faith in bringing the Rule 9006(b)(1) motion. Id.
41 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1493. Referencing the two Dix factors that the creditors did
not satisfy, the bankruptcy court directed that a ruling in the creditor's favor would
"'render nugatory the fixing of the claims' bar date in this case.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
42 Id. (citation omitted).
43 Id.
44 In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 679 (6th Cir. 1991), afftd, 113 S.Ct.
1489 (1993).
45 Id. at 677. The Sixth Circuit explained that it would follow a textured approach
in its excusable neglect analysis, and pointed out that the Dix factors would only assist
in that analysis. Id. Thus, the court refused to adopt the Dix factors as a complete
and necessary list for each case. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. The Sixth Circuit reminded that, ultimately, the creditor's attorney was re-
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date, Richards responded that no urgency existed. 48 Finally, the
court referenced Official Bankruptcy Form 16 to show the disparity
between the normal notice form and the unorthodox letter sent to
49
the creditors.
Recognizing a dispute among the circuit courts concerning
the interpretation and application of the excusable neglect standard, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 50 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision and adopted
the Dix factors.5" The Supreme Court held that the excusable neglect standard required consideration of not only the creditor's
fault, but also the present effects of allowing a late claim filing.5"
Additionally, the majority refuted the debtor's contention that excusable neglect required a strict interpretation under which late
claims would be allowed only if the filer had no reasonable control
over the delay.5 3
sponsible for filing the proofs of claims. Id. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit opined
that the creditors should receive less blame for the delay. Id. at 677-78.
48 Id. at 677. The Sixth Circuit also pointed out that the bankruptcy court attributed no negligence, culpability, or bad faith to the creditors. Id.
49 Id. at 678. Official Bankruptcy Form 16 provides creditors with, inter alia, the
deadlines for filing proofs of claim. See 11 U.S.C. app. at 316-17 (1988) (setting forth
Bankruptcy Official Form Number 16). The circuit court quoted the pertinent section
of Form 16, which states:
The debtor [or trustee] has filed or will file a list of creditors and equity
security holders pursuant to Rule 1007. Any creditor holding a listed
claim which is not listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated as to
amount, may, but need not, file a proof of claim in this case. Creditors
whose claims are not listed or whose claims are listed as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated as to amount and who desire to participate in
the case or share in any distribution must file their proofs of claim on or
before [Insert date], which date is hereby fixed as the last day for filing a
proof of claim ....
Id. The Sixth Circuit conceded that the bar date notice need not necessarily mimic
this Form but stressed that the meeting letter sent to the creditors contained no reference to the significance of the claims bar date. Pioneer,943 F.2d at 678. The circuit
court concluded that the notice given to the creditors was, therefore, inconspicuous
and peculiar. Id. The Sixth Circuit declared that even extensively experienced bankruptcy attorneys would not have received notice of the claims bar date in the initial
meeting letter sent to the creditors. Id.
After the Bankruptcy Rules were amended in 1991, the provisions relating to
creditors' meetings were moved from Official Form Number 16 to Official Form
Number 9. See 11 U.S.C. app. at 1425 (Supp. IV 1992) (setting forth Bankruptcy Official Form Number 9).
50 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 112 S. Ct. 2963 (1992).
51 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1498, 1500 (1993). The
Court explained that it substantially agreed with the Sixth Circuit's five-factor excusable neglect analysis. Id. See supranote 37 and accompanying text (detailing the initial
Dix factors.)
52 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1498.
53 Id. at 1494. The Court explained that Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations
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The excusable neglect phrase of Rule 9006(b) (1) originated
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) (Rule 6(b))."A Early cases
involving excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) were inconsistent.5
attempt to rehabilitate the debtor while avoiding forfeitures by creditors in an equitable manner. Id. at 1495. This premise, the Court claimed, clashed with Pioneer's
strict view that the goal of bankruptcy was finality and certainty in all proceedings. Id.
at 1494.
54 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) (1) advisory committee's notes (noting that excusable neglect was borrowed from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)); see also 4A
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MITLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165
(1987) (discussing the "elastic" excusable neglect concept and its development). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) (Rule 6(b)) provides, in pertinent part:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion... (2)
upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit
the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect...
FED. R. Crv. P. 6(b). Courts utilize Rule 6(b) to provide extensions of time to parties
who fail to perform an act mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103 F.R.D. 553, 555 (M.D. Pa. 1984). If a party
has failed to request an extension until after the time specified under a rule expires,
courts may grant an extension under Rule 6(b) (2) if "the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect." Id. at 555. When considering "excusable neglect" motions
under Rule 6(b), courts may exercise their sole discretion. Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I.
Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6.08
(1993) ("[T]he courts generally have given Rule 6(b) a liberal interpretation in order
to work substantial justice.").
55 WRIGHT & MILER, supra note 54, at § 1165. For example, in Staggers v. Otto
Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966), and Graham v. PennsylvaniaRailroad,342 F.2d
914 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the excusable neglect standard received opposite treatments.
Id.
Staggers concerned a motion to substitute a party under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(a)(1) after the original plaintiff died. Staggers, 359 F.2d at 294, 295.
Rule 25(a) (1) provides, in pertinent part: "Ifa party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties." FED. R. CIV. P.
25(a) (1). Rule 25(a) (1) also allows a 90 day time limit for substitution. Id. In Staggers,
the original plaintiff instituted a breach of contract claim for $380,000 concerning a
sale of 19,000 tons of rice. Staggers, 359 F.2d at 293. Upon the plaintiffs death, no
replacement was offered until two days after the 90 day deadline. Id. at 296. The
Second Circuit, however, allowed the substitution under Rule 6(b). Id. The court
recognized that the deceased's son-in-law had to obtain another court's permission
and consult a multitude of potential parties before requesting the substitution. Id. at
295, 296. The crucial determination, the court of appeals stressed, however, was that
the defendants would not be "prejudiced" by a two day trial delay. Id. at 296. The
court also noted that the "requirement of finality (of a procedural rule) is to be given
a practical, rather than a technical, construction." Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
In Graham, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed a similar
delayed motion for substitution of a party. Graham, 342 F.2d at 915. The asserted
reason for the delay was ignorance of recent changes governing Rule 25(a) (1). Id.
Rejecting this excuse, the court reasoned that the attorney had ample time to digest
the new rules that the Supreme Court had approved almost six months before their
implementation. Id. at 916.

1066

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1056

Some courts applied a strict interpretation,5 6 but others preferred
a more liberal approach.
When the Bankruptcy Reform Act was adopted in 1978, the
excusable neglect doctrine's conflicting interpretations were maintained under Rule 9006(b) (1).58 An example of a court's application of the strict standard59 was evidenced in In re Gem Rail Corp.6"
In Gem Rai4 the debtor neglected to file a financial affairs statement 6 in a bankruptcy proceeding while awaiting a ruling on a
disputed sheriff's sale. 62 Disallowing the debtor's motion to file a
late statement, the court held that debtors must adhere to judicially imposed deadlines, regardless of pending motions.6" The
56 See, e.g., Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 511 F.2d 1030, 1031 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that missing a deadline because of an inadvertent failure to pay filing fees did not
constitute "excusable neglect"); Citizens' Protective League v. Clark, 178 F.2d 703,
704 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (declaring that a busy office schedule did not warrant deadline
extension under Rule 6(b)'s "excusable neglect").
57 See, e.g., Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 629, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that
"excusable neglect" was shown where a party did not receive notice of deadline until
thirteen days before such deadline due to an address change); Colgate-Palmolive Co.
v. North Am. Chemical Corp., 238 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (granting a
party an "excusable neglect" extension when the docket schedule inadvertently set
response date for filing an answer on a later day); Redmond v. O'Sullivan Rubber
Co., 10 F.R.D. 519, 520, 521 (W.D. Va. 1943) (permitting an excusable neglect extension to a defendant who filed an answer four days late because the plaintiff was not
prejudiced and the trial was still seven weeks away).
58 See supra note 15 (detailing the split among the circuit courts in interpreting
"excusable neglect" under Rule 9006(b) (1)).
59 The strict standard provided that circumstances delaying a claims filing must be
beyond the creditor's reasonable control. In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 106 B.R. 510,
514 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); see also In reSTN Enterprises Inc., 94 B.R. 329, 332, 333
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1988) (refusing to consider a late claim filing's prejudicial effect upon
the debtor for Rule 9006(b) (1) excusable neglect purposes).
60 12 B.R. 929 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
61 Id. at 930. In a bankruptcy proceeding, debtors are required to file a statement
of financial affairs pursuant to § 521(1). 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1988). See supra note 7
and accompanying text (detailing § 521).
62 Gem Rail, 12 B.R. at 931. The Gem Rail debtor had received a time extension for
filing the financial affairs statement. Id. The sheriffs sale of the debtor's assets occurred one day after this extension, and the debtor claimed that filing a statement
became impossible because the creditor had acquired too many of the debtor's
records in the sale. Id. Eighteen days after the final day for filing the statements
passed, the debtor filed another motion to extend the time for submitting the required documents. Id.
63 Id. at 931, 932. The Gem Rail court maintained that allowing unnecessary time
extensions would frustrate judicial efficiency. Id. at 932. Although the debtor
claimed an inability to comply with the court's deadline for filing financial affairs
statements, the court stressed that the debtor made no affirmative effort to retrieve
the documents necessary for completing the statement. Id. at 931. As a result, the
court concluded, the delay was within the debtor's control and would not be excused
under Rule 9006(b) (1). Id. at 931-32.
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court cited federal precedent, stressing that delays avoidable
through a party's diligence did not warrant an excusable neglect
extension.6 4 Circumstances delaying a claim, the court maintained, must be beyond the creditor's reasonable control.6 5
In In re South Atlantic Financial Coip.,66 the Eleventh Circuit
also adopted a strict excusable neglect interpretation after examining its previous holdings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 7 In South Atlantic, the court affirmed a ruling that an
appearance by the creditor's counsel would not substitute for a
claim filing.' Facing a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the various district court findings and concluded that
strict excusable neglect guidelines comported with its previous
64 Id. The Gem Rail court recognized the Rule 6(b) origins of excusable neglect.
Id. at 931 (citation omitted). The court offered that excusable neglect extensions
would most likely occur in cases where a party did not receive proper notice of a
deadline. Id. (citing In re Loveridge, 2 B.C.D. 1597, 1598 (D. Conn. 1977)); see also
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 120 F.R.D. 51, 51-52
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (allowing a Rule 6(b) extension under excusable neglect where movants failed to receive notice of court deadline at their current address); Anderson v.
Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 108, 109-10 (D.S.C. 1971) (holding that defendant's failure to file an answer was excusable under Rule 6(b) because both of defendant's attorneys were away for holidays when notice was mailed).
65 Gem Rai/ 12 B.R. at 931-32; see also In reJackson, 98 B.R. 738, 739, 742 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1986) (denying a creditor's Rule 9006(b) (1) motion for extension of claims bar
deadline). In Jackson, the creditor received court warning of claims bar date and
knew of the bankruptcy proceeding up to five months before its commencement. Id.
at 742. The court denied the Rule 9006(b)(1) extension motion because the creditor
had no excuse for failing to check the court clerk's file for the claims bar deadline or
for failing to check the creditor's own records. Id. The court reminded that circumstances causing a filing delay must be "unique" for an excusable neglect extension.
Id. But see In re Wells, 87 B.R. 862, 865 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (declaring that, in
deciding excusable neglect situations, "courts . . . must recognize the possibility of
human error and decline to penalize [movants] when those errors are explained").
66 767 F.2d. 814 (11th Cir. 1985).
67 Id. at 817-18. For example, in McLaughlin v. City of LaGrange, the Eleventh Circuit denied excusable neglect relief to a party under Rule 6(b) where the only asserted reason for missing a summary judgment motion deadline was an attorney's
busy schedule. McLaughlin v. City of LaGrange, 662 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 979 (1982).
68 South Atlantic, 767 F.2d at 816, 819. Initially, the creditor attempted to obtain a
Rule 9006(b) (1) extension because the two attorneys handling the bankruptcy case
had apparently miscommunicated information concerning whether the claim had
been filed. Id. at 816. The district court refused to allow an extension under Rule
9006(b) (1). Id. Although the creditor neglected to file his proof of claim on time,
the district court recognized that the creditor's attorney had made a court appearance before the deadline to request that the court forward all future orders and
pleadings. Id. at 815, 816. The district court allowed both sides to argue whether this
counsel appearance could constitute "an informal proof of claim." Id. at 816. The
creditor argued that this counsel appearance should constitute a claim filing, which
could be amended. Id. Ultimately, the district court denied the motion. Id.
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holdings concerning Rule 6(b). 6 9 Although the court recognized
that certain lower courts favorably considered the prejudicial effect
of a Rule 9006(b) (1) filing upon opposing parties,7 ° the court refused to circumvent the plain meaning of excusable neglect.7" In
so holding, the South Atlantic court focused the excusable neglect
72
analysis solely on whether the creditor caused the delay.
After the South Atlantic decision, other circuit courts, including
the Fourth Circuit in In re Davis,73 adamantly adhered to a strict
interpretation. 4 In Davis, a debtor sought an extension to file a
69 Id. at 817-18; see, e.g., McLaughlin, 662 F.2d at 1387-88 (holding that excusable
neglect was inapplicable where a sole practitioner's busy schedule caused delay). For
a decision rejecting an untimely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
see Graham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 342 F.2d 914, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (concluding
that counsel's unfamiliarity with a new rule of civil procedure did not constitute excusable neglect). But see Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urunleri
Dis Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 748 F. Supp. 177, 180, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing defendant, a foreign corporation, to respond five weeks late to an interpleader complaint under Rule 6(b) because defendant had little knowledge of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
70 South Atlantic, 767 F.2d at 818. (citing In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 35 B.R.
854, 866 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 493
F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 1974)). For example, in In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York declared that "[t ] he standard
of 'excusable neglect' [under Rule 9006(b) (1)] is a flexible one which is subject to
interpretation by the trier of fact in each instance." O.P.M. Leasing, 35 B.R. at 866
(citation omitted).
71 South Atlantic, 767 F.2d at 818-19. The "plain meaning rule" is defined as "[a]
rule used to interpret statutes which says that the court will interpret words in the
statute according to their usual or 'plain' meaning as understood by the general public." BLAcK's LAw DIcIoNARY 796 (6th ed. 1991). The South Atlantic court emphasized that the language of Rule 9006(b) (1) clearly focuses "on the movant's actions
and the reasons for those actions, not on the effect that an extension might have on
the other parties' positions." South Atlantic, 767 F.2d. at 819.
The court also cited the Rule 9006(b) (1) advisory committee notes, which mention that the "excusable neglect" phrase was taken from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2). Id. at 818 (citation omitted).
72 South Atlantic, 767 F.2d at 819. The court rejected the notion that the effects of
a late filing should influence an excusable neglect determination. Id.; see also Chrysler
Motors Corp. v. Schneiderman, 940 F.2d. 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that
delayed filing of proof of claim could have been avoided if the creditor had used
certified mail with return receipt to send the claim); In re Energy Resources Co., 82
B.R. 172, 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (declaring that the unexpected absence of an
attorney's clerical support the day before a deadline did not constitute a circumstance
"beyond the reasonable control of [the attorney]" in terms of excusable neglect) (citation omitted); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 72 B.R. 68, 69, 70 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1987) (ruling that the United States Army's time consuming internal procedures did
not justify an excusable delay).
73 936 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1991).
74 Id. at 774; see also In re Danielson, 981 F.2d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a debtor, who neglected to review a court clerk's claims list, did not miss filing
deadline due to excusable neglect); In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 933 F.2d 939, 940, 942
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claim on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)." The court
ruled that the debtor's ignorance of whether the IRS had already
filed a claim did not represent an excusable neglect situation.7 6
The Davis court based its excusable neglect analysis solely upon the
debtor's actions that caused the missed deadline. 7 Because the
debtor had only itself to blame for the tardy filing, the court concluded that Rule 9006(b) (1) could not provide an extension.78
(11th Cir. 1991) (declaring that the creditor's failure to file a claim while relying
upon fraudulent statements by debtor, who was also creditor's husband, did not constitute a situation beyond the creditor's control); Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota, N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that employee turnover
at a corporation that caused delay exemplified conduct within the creditor's control
and, therefore, did not constitute excusable neglect).
75 Davis, 936 F.2d. at 773. In Davis, the debtors voluntarily filed a Chapter 7 petition. Id. The debtors listed a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on
their list of creditors. Id. When the IRS failed to file a claim by the deadline, the
debtors then filed a claim for the IRS under Bankruptcy Rule 3004. Id.; see FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3004. Rule 3004 provides: "Ifa creditor fails to file a proof of claim on or
before the first date set for the meeting of creditors called pursuant to § 341 (a) of the
Code, the debtor or trustee may do so in the name of the creditor." Id. Debtors
choose to file proofs of claim on behalf of the IRS because, under § 523(a) (1) of the
Code, tax debts are not discharged by bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (1) (1988);
Danielson, 981 F.2d at 297. Section 523(a) (1) states: "A discharge under.., this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-(1) for a tax or customs duty
... 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a) (1). The purpose of filing such claims is to ensure that no tax
debt remains after the chapter 7 liquidation. See Danielson, 981 F.2d at 297 (noting
that "[i]f ... taxes are not paid, the debt passes through bankruptcy and remains
collectible 'whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed'") (citation
omitted).
76 Davis, 936 F.2d. at 773, 774. The debtors argued that their failure to file the
claim was excusable because the court did not notify them of whether the IRS had
filed a proof of claim, and also because the IRS tax liability had not been assessed. Id.
at 774. The Davis court first declared that the bankruptcy court owed no affirmative
duty to notify creditors when claims were filed. Id. Instead, the court proclaimed that
the court clerk must maintain only a claims docket. Id. Further, the court asserted
that the "assessment of a tax is not a prerequisite to the imposition of tax liability." Id.
(citing In re Hatchett, 31 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)). The court further
reminded that the tax became a personal liability to debtors once their corporation
defaulted on its IRS payment. Id. at 774-75. As a result, the court recognized that
because debtors had knowledge of their corporate debts, the debtors also had knowledge of their IRS obligations. Id. at 775-76. Accordingly, the court denied excusable
neglect relief because the debtors were aware of the tax liability when proofs of claim
were due under Bankruptcy Rule 3004. Id. at 774-75.
77 Id. The court reminded that a Rule 9006(b)(1) inquiry contemplates whether
the failure to perform an act on time resulted from "circumstances which were beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform." Id. at 774
(citation omitted). The court stressed that the debtor's failure to file a claim under
Rule 3004 did not constitute excusable neglect but rather was "the result of [a]
[d]ebtor's lack of diligence in pursuing their statutory advantage." Id. at 775.
78 Id. at 774-75; see also In re Crawford, 135 B.R. 128, 132 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991)
(denying an extension to file a claim on behalf of the IRS where delay was solely the
debtor's fault). In Crawford,a Chapter 7 debtor attempted to file a late proof of claim
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Simultaneous with the development of the strict excusable neglect standard, a distinctly liberal interpretation evolved. 79 Because
the strict precedents in bankruptcy cases were based upon Rule
6(b) interpretations in non-bankruptcy proceedings, the liberal
standard also had the same roots.8 0 In re Four Seasons SecuritiesLaws
8 1 evidenced the liberal attitude some courts adopted
Litigation
when initially applying Rule 6(b).82
on behalf of the IRS. Id. at 129, 130. The court explained that the excusable neglect
inquiry centered on whether the party who neglected to perform could have prevented the delay through due diligence. Id. at 131. The court refused to allow an
excusable neglect filing extension where the debtor included the IRS on its bankruptcy schedules but failed to file an IRS claim because of uncertainty of the exact
amount owed to the IRS. Id. at 131, 132. The court reminded that the debtor could
have filed a claim with an estimated amount that "would have put the burden on the
IRS to determine the actual amount and file an amended proof of claim." Id. at 131.
The court concluded, therefore, that the debtor's failure to file a claim resulted from
the debtor's own inactivity. Id. at 132.
79 See supra note 15 (noting the 10th Circuit's adoption of the liberal approach in
analyzing extensions under Rule 9006(b)(1)).
80 See supra note 55 (discussing the origins of Rule 6(b) liberal interpretations in
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966)).
81 493 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1974).
82 See In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Corp., 106 B.R. 510, 516 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(noting that some courts, such as the Fourth Circuit in In re FourSeasons Securities Laws
Litigation, considered the prejudicial effect of a late claims filing in determining the
existence of excusable neglect); see also Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal Inc., 456 F.2d
677, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1972) (allowing a party to post a delayed bond under an excusable neglect extension). In Coady, the District Court of Puerto Rico ordered the plaintiff to post a $250 bond within 90 days as security for the costs, attorney's fees, and
expenses of the defendant in a personal injury action. Id. at 678. The plaintiff did
not file the bond until after the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to file
such bond. Id. Plaintiff moved to excuse the late posting of the bond under excusable
neglect. Id. The Coady court examined the plaintiffs bond-posting delay under an
"excusable neglect" analysis and declared that the inquiry depended on both the importance of the involved matter and the prejudice to the other party. Id. Because the
personal injury case had not begun, the court declared that an excusable neglect
extension would be so unprejudicial that justice required excusing the late bond filing. Id. at 678-79; see also Hammons v. International Playtex, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1114,
1118-19 (D. Wyo. 1988) (finding that "excusable neglect" inquiries under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) (2) require "both a demonstration of good faith and a
reasonable basis for failing to comply with the specified time period") (citation
omitted).
Some courts eventually adopted the liberal excusable neglect approach in bankruptcy proceedings under Rule 9006(b)(1). See, e.g., In re Mullins, 55 B.R. 618, 621
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985). In Mullins, the creditors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding filed a tardy complaint objecting to a debt discharge. Id. at 618-19. The creditors
argued that settlement meetings and their attorney's busy schedule prevented them
from filing a timely objection. Id. at 622. Rejecting these excuses, the court pointed
out that Rule 9006(b) (1) excusable neglect time extensions contemplated several factors, including adequacy of notice, sophistication of the creditor, source of the delay,
and prejudice to the debtor. Id.; see also In re Frankina, 29 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1983) (holding that "excusable neglect" motions must be considered in light of
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In FourSeasons, a potential class action plaintiff, a bank, sought
exclusion from the class to pursue a private suit.8 3 The bank
moved pursuant to Rule 6(b) to extend the allowable time for opting out of the class action.8 4 The Four Seasons court granted the
extension, holding that the delayed withdrawal from the class resulted from excusable neglect.8 5 Expanding the excusable neglect
inquiry beyond an examination of the bank's part in the delay, 6
the court reasoned that the movant's good faith and the lack of a
prejudicial effect upon other plaintiffs warranted a late
withdrawal.8 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created a schism among the circuits by applying the liberal Four Seasons excusable neglect view to the bankruptcy rules for the first
time in In re Magouirk.8a In Magouirk, the bankruptcy court denied
the submission of a creditor's tardy complaint disputing the dischargeability of a debt. 9 The creditor appealed, claiming that the
the party's good faith as well as a reasonable basis for not complying with a deadline)
(citation omitted).
83 Four Seasons, 493 F.2d. at 1289. The class action originated from damages incurred through an investment counsellor's advice to purchase Four Seasons' securities. Id. Four Seasons subsequently instituted bankruptcy proceedings, thereby
causing substantial losses for the investors. Id. All potential plaintiffs received notice
of the class action, which included instructions for opting out of the class. Id.
Although the potential litigant did not follow the exclusion instructions exactly, he
notified the class action representative of his intention to withdraw from the suit. Id.
at 1288-89.
84 Id. at 1290. The bank was required to opt out of the proceeding with a written
request. Id. at 1289. To evidence its intent to be excluded, the bank relied on a letter
that expressed concern over its participation in the class action. Id. at 1289-90. Moreover, the bank noted that this letter had been sent to the class action trustee before
the deadline to opt out expired. Id. at 1289. The court found that although the letter
was not a direct request to be excluded from the class, the potential plaintiff exhibited good faith and had a reasonable basis for relying upon its letter for exclusion. Id.
at 1290-91.
85 Id. The court stressed that the would-be litigant was not seeking any advantage
by leaving the class. Id. at 1290. The court further noted that, if the party left the
class, his absence would not affect the monetary recovery of the class action plaintiffs.
Id. at 1290-91.
86 Id. at 1290. The court noted that the potential plaintiffs letter evidencing apprehensiveness towards the class action received a delayed response. Id. Further, the
court reminded that the counsel for the class action plaintiffs knew of the potential
plaintiff's intent to be excluded from the class long before the exclusion deadline. Id.
87 Id. at 1290-91. The court stressed that the potential plaintiff sought no tactical
advantage with the delay in withdrawing, and that the potential plaintiff was merely
seeking to clarify the class action details when the letter notifying its withdrawal was
sent. Id. at 1290.
88 693 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
89 Id. at 949. In Magouirk, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and listed a debt to Fasson Corporation (creditor) among its liabilities. Id. The

1072

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1056

bankruptcy judge's strict excusable neglect analysis of the Rule
9006(b) (1) motion was incorrect. 90
Expressing no opinion on the merits of the motion, the court
used the opportunity to formulate an excusable neglect framework. 9 1 The court explained that an excusable neglect motion involved different considerations depending upon its procedural
context.9 2 Distinguishing between appeals of a decision on the
merits9 3 and appeals of a motion to reopen a default judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),9 4 the court declared
that consideration of the latter should include equitable factors. 95
court sent a notice to all creditors setting the last day for filing complaints to challenge the dischargeability of individual debts. Id. The creditor confused this date with
another court deadline and, as a result, filed its complaint late. Id. Refusing to accept
the tardy complaint, the court rejected the creditor's argument that the scheduling
confusion constituted excusable neglect. Id.
90 Id. at 949-50.
91 Id. at 950-52. The court explained that the excusable neglect standard had "differing interpretations, depending upon the procedural context in which it appears."
Id. at 950.
92 Id. The court distinguished between former Bankruptcy Rule 802 (now 8002),
which covered appeal motions, and former Bankruptcy Rule 924 (now 9024), which
patterned Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. at 950-51. Rule 8002(c) provides, in pertinent part:
A request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must be made
before the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired, except that a
request made no more than 20 days after the expiration of the time for
filing a notice of appeal may be granted upon a showing of excusable
neglect ....
FED. R. BANKa. P. 8002(c). Conversely, Rule 9024 provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 60 F.RCiv.P. applies in cases under the code except that (1) a
motion to reopen a case under the Code or for the reconsideration of
an order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate entered without a contest is not subject to the one year limitation prescribed in Rule
60(b) ....
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024.
93 Magouirk, 693 F.2d at 951. A "decision on the merits" is defined as "[a] decision
... passing on a controversy with respect to the interpretation thereof which bars
subsequent suit on the same cause of action." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 407 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted).
94 Magouirk, 693 F.2d at 951. A "default judgment" is defined as a "[]udgment
entered against a party who has failed to defend against a claim that has been brought
by another party." BLACK's LAw DICnoNARY 417 (6th ed. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) (Rule 60(b)) provides, in pertinent part: "On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis
added).
95 Magouirk, 693 F.2d at 951. The court explained that "excusable neglect" warranted a liberal construction "in those instances where the order or judgment forecloses trial on the merits of a claim." Id. (citations omitted). The Magouirk court
reiterated that motions to reopen a default judgment under Rule 60(b) "may con-
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The Magouirk court reasoned that a motion to set aside a default
judgment, like a motion to file a delayed complaint, warranted a
standard because a decision on the merits never
more liberal
6
9

occurred.

Recognizing the need for a liberal standard, the court
presented the relevant considerations that included: (1) prejudice

to the debtor; (2) effect upon court efficiency; (3) culpability of
the movant towards the delay; (4) movant's good faith; and (5)
imposition of the burden of the attorney's mistake on the late
filer. 97 The court concluded that in deciding a motion to file a late
discharge of debts complaint, a court should consider the equities
of a situation, rather than only the movant's culpability.9 8 A liberal
interpretation was proper, the court reasoned, because the creditor's appeal did not challenge the merits of a decision, but rather a
failure to file a complaint that would initiate a decision.9 9
sider the merits of the untested claim and determine whether setting aside the order
will prejudice the other party." Id. (citing Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355
(9th Cir. 1974)). In Schwab, the Ninth Circuit considered a defendant's motion to
reopen a default judgment in a corporate antitrust action. Schwab, 508 F.2d at 353,
354. In Rule 60(b) motions, the court explained, a judge has discretion to decide
whether to reopen a defaultjudgment. Id. at 355. The court then detailed the important considerations for such motions. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the rule's
remedial nature required a liberal application, that decisions on the merits were favored over defaultjudgments, and that a movant's valid defense should be resolved in
favor of vacating a default judgment. Id. (citations omitted).
96 Magouirk, 693 F.2d at 951. The Magouirk court reiterated that a liberal "excusable neglect" interpretation should have been applied because a motion to extend the
time to file a complaint was most procedurally similar to a Rule 60(b) motion to set
aside a default judgment. Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that
where a court has not even heard the merits, it has more flexibility in applying excusable neglect. Id. The court reminded that the appeal would not challenge the "correctness" of a decision, but rather whether the merits should be contested at all. Id.
97 Id. (citing In re Heyward, 15 B.R. 629, 636 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Hinote,
13 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Klayer, 13 B.R. 542, 545 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1981); In re Wallace, 12 B.R. 938, 940 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Gerber, 7 B.R.
910, 911 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)). These bankruptcy cases, the Magouirk court noted,
had utilized a broad range of factors to liberally construe "excusable neglect." Id.
98 Id. The Magouirk court opined that a liberal excusable neglect analysis proved
especially applicable to motions concerning an objection to the discharge of a
debtor's debt. Id. Accordingly, the Magouirk court remanded the creditor's motion to
the bankruptcy court for reconsideration under the flexible five-factor analysis. Id. at
951-52.
99 Id. at 951. The reasoning of Magouirk eventually became antiquated, however,
because the motion was not considered under the current Code. In re Rhodes, 71
B.R. 206, 208 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); see also In re Knobel, 54 B.R. 458, 460-61 (Bankr.
D.C. Colo. 1985) (agreeing that excusable neglect no longer applies under Rule
4007). In Rhodes, the Ninth Circuit explained that Rule 9006(b) (3) lists certain rules
that may not receive 9006(b) (1) excusable neglect extensions. Rhodes, 71 B.R. at 208.
Rule 9006(b) (3) provides: "[Bankruptcy courts] may enlarge the time for taking action under [Rule] ... 4007(c) ... only to the extent and under the conditions stated
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The scope of this preliminary standard was expanded in In re
in which the Ninth Circuit applied the Magouirk test to a
creditor's late proof of claim filing under Rule 9006(b)(1).l °l
While recognizing that both liberal and strict excusable neglect interpretations existed, the Ninth Circuit followed the Magouirk approach. 10 2 The court reasoned that because a late claim filing
motion would not challenge an adjudicated issue, a more liberal
excusable neglect standard applied.'03 As a result, the court
excusable neglect approach to
adapted Magouirk's multi-factored
10 4
motions.
claim
of
delayed proof
The Supreme Court ended the excusable neglect debate in
Dix,1 0

P. 9006(b)(3). Rule 4007(c) states: "A complaint to
in those rules." FED. R. BANKR'Va.
determine the dischargeability of any debt ... shall be filed not later than 60 days
The motion shall be
following the first date set for the meeting of creditors ....
made before the time has expired." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). The Rhodes court
clarified that Rule 4007(c) governed the time for filing complaints to discharge debts.
Rhodes, 71 B.R_ at 208. Rule 4007(c), however, contrasts with Rule 404, which the
Magouirk court utilized for its analysis of excusable neglect in discharge of debt motions. Magouirk, 693 F.2d at 950. Former Bankruptcy Rule 404(c) provides: "The
court may for cause, on its own initiative or on application of any party in interest,
extend the time for filing a complaint objecting to discharge." Bankruptcy Rule
404(c).
Although Magouirk concerned a bankruptcy rule that no longer utilizes Rule
9006(b) (1) excusable neglect assistance, the Magouirk court's reasoning was followed
by future courts when examining excusable neglect. See In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134, 137 n.2
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) ("It is well established that current Bankruptcy Rules 4007(c)
and 9006(b) (3) no longer grant a court discretion to enlarge the time for filing [complaints objecting to dischargeability.] ... However, the discussion in Magouirk regarding the varying standards of excusable neglect would still seem to be valid.").
100 95 B.R. 134 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988).
101 Id. at 136, 138. In D/x, the bankruptcy filer had various business relationships
with a creditor, who was also a personal acquaintance. Id. at 136. Amidst many complicated financial ventures, the creditor was unaware of his claim against the debtor.
Id. Consequently, the creditor received no notice of the proceeding and was forced
to file a tardy proof of claim under Rule 9006(b) (1). Id.
102 Id. at 137-38. The Dix court reiterated a preference to allow the merits of each
motion to be considered. Id. at 138. The court insinuated that disallowing a late
proof of claim filing constituted the foreclosure of a trial on the merits. Id. The court
agreed with the Magouirk court's analysis, and ruled that a liberally construed application of excusable neglect was applicable. Id.
103 Id. The court suggested that it disfavored rejecting procedural motions. Id.; see
also In re Paul, 101 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. S.D. Ca. 1989) (accepting late ballots that
rejected a Chapter 11 reorganization plan because no delay in judicial administration
would occur, and no prejudice to the debtor would result because ballots were submitted prior to the plan confirmation hearing).
104 Dix, 95 B.R. at 138. The Dix court proceeded to analyze the motion under the
factors enunciated in Magouirk. Id. at 138-39. The court allowed the late proof of
claim because the debtor's reorganization plan took the creditor into account, the
court faced no added delay, the evidence did not suggest that the creditor knew of
the claim prior to the bar date, and the creditor evidenced no bad faith. Id.
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PioneerInvestment Services v. Brunswick Associates.t °5 While formulating its excusable neglect analysis, the Court addressed the issue of
whether an attorney's erroneous advice that caused a late claim
filing constituted excusable neglect under Rule 9006(b) (1).106
Writing for the majority, Justice White immediately dismissed
Pioneer's strict interpretation as contrary to both Rule 9006(b)
(1)'s1 °7 wording and function. 108 Initially, the Court defined "neglect" and concluded that a late claim filer could, in fact, be at fault
and still receive a Rule 9006(b) (1) extension.1 0 9 Justice White
maintained that by utilizing the word neglect, Congress addressed
not only situations where a filing delay was inevitable, but also circumstances where the late filer exhibited some fault towards the
10
delay.
Distinguishing Chapter 11 from the other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, the majority then examined the legislative history of Rule 9006(b) (1). 111 Justice White argued that the application of Rule 9006(b) (1) to Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings,
as opposed to Chapter 7 liquidations, 12 stemmed from the for113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
Id. at 1492, 1494.
Id. at 1494. Rule 9006(b) (1) allows late claims to be filed in Chapter 11 proceedings "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9006(b) (1).
108 Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1494. Pioneer advocated a stringent view of the Bankruptcy
Code that would lead to certainty and finality in resolving Chapter 11 bankruptcy
claims. Id. A strict application of excusable neglect, the Court recognized, would
inhibit the granting of extension requests when the creditor contributed to the delay
in any fashion. Id. Justice White rejected Pioneer's strict excusable neglect interpretation, however, because a flexible interpretation comported with the policy of bankruptcy, and Chapter 11 in particular. Id. at 1495.
109 Id. at 1494-95. The court defined "neglect" as "'to give little attention or respect' to a matter, or . . . 'to leave undone or unattended esp[ecially] through carelessness." Id. (emphasis and brackets in Pioneer) (quoting WEBSTERS NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DicTIoNARY 791 (1983)). Justice White explicated that courts must utilize
the ordinary meaning of a statute's words unless Congress indicated otherwise. Id. at
1495 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
110 Id. Furthermore, Justice White explained that "Congress plainly contemplated
that the courts would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by
inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond
the creditor's control." Id.
105
106
107

111 Id.

112 A liquidation is defined as a "Is]ale, ordinarily by the trustee, of the debtor's
nonexempt assets and distribution of the proceeds to the creditors; the end result of a
case under chapter 7 where there is no reorganization or rehabilitation of the debtor
but the assets of the estate are distributed to the claimants." COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcY
(Index), at GT-14 (15th ed. 1993). The majority pointed out that Rule 9006(b) (1)
would not apply to Chapter 7 liquidation cases. Pioneer, 113 S.Ct. at 1495 (footnote
omitted). The Court explained that Rule 9006(b) (3) mandates that Chapter 7 time
extension motions are governed by Rule 3002(c), which has no excusable neglect
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mer's goal of saving a business compared to the latter's goal of
efficient asset distribution. 1 3 Emphasizing the role of Chapter 11
in the Bankruptcy Code,Justice White concluded that an excusable
neglect determination was conditioned upon equitable considerations." 4 The Justice stressed that a court monitoring a restructuring procedure must at times use its equitable discretion to facilitate
5
the reorganization."
The majority also detailed the statutory ancestors of Rule
9006(b) (1) to explain its liberal interpretation. 1 6 Utilizing the Advisory Committee Notes from past bankruptcy rules, Justice White
recognized that certain reorganization provisions required consideration of all equitable factors." 7 The majority built upon its hisprovision. Id. at 1495 n.4. Rule 9006(b) (3) provides: "The court may enlarge the
time for taking action under Rules 1006(b) (2), 3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c),
8002, and 9033, only to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules."
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) (3). Furthermore, Rule 3002(c) states: "In a chapter 7 liquidation or chapter 13 individual's debt adjustment case, a proof of claim shall be filed
within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors called pursuant to
§ 341(a) of the Code, except as follows..." FED. R. BA~NK. P. 3002(c). The majority
concluded that because Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) covers proof of claim filings in
Chapter 7 exclusively, the excusable neglect provision of 9006(b) (1) applied only to
Chapter 11. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1495 n.4.
113 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1495. See supra note 2 (describing the difference between
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
114 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1495. To ensure that the debtor's reorganization succeeds,
the Court stressed that bankruptcy courts must equitably balance the interests of all
Chapter 11 parties. Id. (citation omitted).
"5 Id. (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984)). In Bildisco, a
Chapter 11 filer sought to invalidate a collective bargaining agreement during its reorganization. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 517, 518. Under the agreement, the debtor asserted
that it could not maintain certain health and benefit payments, remittance of dues,
and wage increases for its employees. Id. at 518. The Supreme Court held that in
avoiding such an agreement a bankruptcy court must contemplate, among other
things, the equities of the circumstances. Id. at 527.
116 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1495-96. Justice White explained that current Rules
9006(b) and 3003(c) were derived from former Rules 906(b) and 10-401(b) respectively. Id. The former rules, the majority continued, were utilized in Chapter 10
cases, the equivalent of Chapter 11 disputes before the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978. Id. at 1495.
117 Id. at 1495-96. The majority noted that the Advisory Committee's understanding of Chapter 10 policy was to "preserve rather than to forfeit rights" as exemplified
under former sections 102, 204, and 224. Id. (quotation omitted). Specifically, Justice White noted that former § 102 rejected the absolute six month filing deadline for
asset distributions. Id. (quotation omitted); see [1979-90 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH) 3002, at 3593 (providing that in Chapter 10 corporate reorganizations,
§ 57(n), which states that claims must be filed within a six-month period to participate
in any distribution, shall not apply unless otherwise ordered). The Justice also
pointed to former § 204, which provided that claim filing rights shall not be forfeited
within five years of the bankruptcy petition. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1496; see [1979-90
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3135, at 3693 (declaring that "[ulpon distri-
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torical argument with a 1916 Senate Report that alluded to the
equities of bankruptcy."1 Justice White surmised that, in enacting
Rule 9006(b)(1), Congress anticipated situations in which creditors deserved leniency regardless of some culpability on their part
in filing delayed claims.1 9
Additionally, Justice White cited the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to support the Court's decision. 12' The majority pointed
out that Rule 9006(b)(1) borrowed the excusable neglect phrase
from Rule 6(b).1 2 1 The majority then cited various circuit court
decisions that allowed procedural rule extensions after the movant
exhibited inadvertence, thereby proving that Rule 6(b) was necessarily elastic.1 22 Next, Justice White compared Rule 9006 (b) (1) to
bution, as provided in section 224... of this Act, the judge may, upon notice to all
persons affected, fix a time, to expire not sooner than five years after the final decree
closing the estate, within which, as provided in the plan or final decree . . . [t]he
creditors, other than holders of securities, shall file, assign, transfer, or release their
claims"). Finally, Justice White referred to former § 224, which permitted non-filing
creditors to participate in asset distributions. Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1496; see[1979-90
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 3187, at 3,708 (allowing that "[d] istribution
shall be made, in accordance with the provisions of the plan, to creditors and stockholders... if [proofs of claim] not so filed, whose claims or stock have been listed by
the trustee or scheduled by the debtor in possession").
118 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1496 (quotation omitted). The Senate Report stated:
Sections 204 and 205 insure participation in the benefits of the reorganization to those who, through inadvertence or otherwise, have
failed to file their claims or otherwise evidence their interests during
the pendency of the proceedings.
This attitude is carried forward in the rules, first by dispensing with
the need to file proofs of claims and stock interests in most instances
and, secondly, by permitting enlargement of the fixed bar date in a particular case with leave of court and for cause shown in accordance with
the equities of the situation.
Bankruptcy Rule 10401 (b) advisory committee's note, reprintedin 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY pt. 4, at 80 (Supp. Nov. 1983).
119 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1496.
120 Id. Justice White referenced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Rules
6(b), 13(0, and 60(b) utilized the excusable neglect phrase. Id. at 1496-97.
121 Id. at 1496. See supra note 54 (detailing the operation of the excusable neglect
provisions under Rule 6(b)).
122 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1496 n.7 (citing United States v. Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750,
753-54 (4th Cir. 1991); Hill v. Marshall, No. 86-3987, 1988 WL 117163, at *2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 4, 1988); Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir. 1988); Sony
Corp. v. Elm State Electronics, Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1986); United States ex
rel. Robinson v. Bar Ass'n of Dist. of Columbia, 190 F.2d 664, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1951))
(further citations omitted). For example, in United States v. Borromeo, the former wife
of a man who was involved in a pending civil forfeiture case filed a late verification
claim against assets being seized in the forfeiture action. Borromeo, 945 F.2d at 751,
752. Because the government had frozen all of the ex-husband's assets in the forfeiture action, the wife was unable to obtain a description of her former spouse's assets,
needed to settle a separate divorce suit between the two. Id. at 751. Concluding that
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f), which allows amended counterclaims."2 3 Citing Rule 13(f) interpretations, the Court observed
that, similar to the Dix factors,24such decisions considered the equities of the movant's position.
Finally, the majority examined excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (1).125 Under this rule, the
Court noted, final judgments may warrant reconsideration within
one year upon a showing of excusable neglect.12 6 Justice White
the excusable neglect equities favored the wife, the court allowed the claim because
"the government [did] not offer even a hint of an insinuation that it would have been
unfairly prejudiced by [the former wife's] intervention." Id. at 754. The Fourth Circuit summarized that allowing the late motion would not defeat the United States's
civil forfeiture case against the wife's ex-husband, but would simply give her an opportunity to be heard regarding her claims to the seized assets. Id.
Similarly, in Hill v. Marshall, a plaintiff appealed the decision of a court that allowed a late answer to a complaint. Hill 1988 WL 117163, at *1, *2. The court noted
that the defendant's only excuse for the late answer was an "administrative oversight."
Id. at *2. The court allowed the tardy answer, however, because the plaintiff failed to
show that his case would be prejudiced as a result of the delay. Id. Accordingly, the
court determined that the delayed answer resulted from excusable neglect. Id.
The Pioneermajority admitted that characterizing a late filing as an "inadvertent
delay" would not guarantee an excusable neglect filing extension, but stressed that an
inadvertent act could not foreclose a Rule 9006(b) extension either. Pioneer,113 S. Ct.
at 1496.
123 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1497. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) provides:
"When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect, or when justice requires, the pleader may by leave of court set up the
counterclaim by amendment." FED. R. CIv. P. 13(1) (emphasis added).
124 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1497 n.10 (citations omitted). Justice White noted that
other courts facing tardy counterclaim motions examined "the good faith of the
claimant, the extent of the delay, and the danger of prejudice to the opposing party."
Id. at 1497 n.10 (citing New York Petroleum Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 757 F.2d 288,
291 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985); Gaines v. Farese, Nos. 87-5567, 87-6006, 1990 WL
153937, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990); Barrett v. United States Banknote Corp., No.
7420 (RPP), 1992 WL 232055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1992); Technographics, Inc. v.
Mercer Corp. 142 F.R.D. 429, 430 (M.D. Pa. 1992)).
In Gaines v. Farese, for example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower court decision
refusing an amended counterclaim in a contract dispute. Gaines, 1990 WL 153937, at
*1, *3. The lower court disallowed the counterclaim because it was filed six months
late and only three months prior to trial. Id. at *3. The court asserted, however, that
"[iun making a Rule 13(f) determination, a court must balance the equities of the
case." Id. Further, the court noted that although the delay in bringing a counterclaim should be considered, it should not be the sole factor in the decision. Id.
Similarly, in Barrett v. United States Banknote Corp., the plaintiff brought suit for
breach of warranty, contract, and misrepresentation against an auction house and
currency printing company. Barrett, 1992 WL 232055, at *2. The court declared that
where the grounds for relief were "colorable," a motion to file a late amended counterclaim, under the excusable neglect analysis, would be allowed "absent any undue
delay, bad faith, or undue prejudice to the opposing party." Id. at *3.
125 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1497. See supra note 94 (detailing Rule 60(b)).
126 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1497; see, e.g., In re Devault Mfg. Co., 4 B.R. 382, 386, 389
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (disallowing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)
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distinguished this standard from a higher standard, used for appeals after one year, 127 to demonstrate that excusable neglect was
not the most stringent analysis. 12' The majority opined that excuscontext of Rule 60(b), contemplated
able neglect, at least in the
129
some type of negligence.
where the debtor neglected to present evidence that was previously available). In In re
Devault Mfg. Co., the bankruptcy court considered a debtor's motion to reconsider an
order that allowed a secured creditor to reclaim some of the debtor's possessions. Id.
at 384. In its motion, the court recognized, the debtor presented new evidence concerning the possible treatment of the creditor's security interest as a voidable preference. Id. at 384-85. The court, however, denied the reconsideration motion,
declaring that evidence previously known and not presented did not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b). Id. at 386.
127 The Court noted that Rule 60(b) (6) governed a motion to reopen a judgment
made after one year. Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1497. Rule 60(b) (6) provides: "On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ...
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
128 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1497. The Court explained that a party seeking relief from
a judgment that occurred over a year before had to show "'extraordinary circumstances' suggesting that the party [was] faultless in the delay." Id. (citations omitted);
see Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950). In Ackermann, the movants
failed to appeal a denaturalization judgment because they received conflicting advice
from their attorney and an Alien Control Officer. Id. at 195, 196. On appeal four
years later, the Court denied relief under Rule 60(b) (6). Id. at 197. The Court'observed that the movants had freely chosen to wait four years to file the motion. Id.
Moreover, the Court stressed that the Alien Control Officer exerted no undue influence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or duress when he advised the movants that
they had to sell their home to appeal the denaturalization judgment. Id. at 196, 198.
Accordingly, the Court declared that "free, calculated, deliberate choices [were] not to
be relieved from." Id. at 198.
But see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 603, 614, 615-16 (1949) (setting
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) four years after the denaturalization
ruling). In Klapprott, the Court allowed Rule 60(b) (6) relief to Klapprott, a citizen
who lost his citizenship without evidence, a hearing, or counsel assistance. Id. at 61516. The Court explained that while Klapprott had been incarcerated on separate
criminal charges, the lower court entered a default judgment for failure to answer a
denaturalization complaint. Id. at 603. The Klapprott Court directed that "the 'other
reason' clause of 60(b) [was] broad enough to authorize the Court to set aside the
default judgment.. . ." Id. at 615. The Court then pointed to Klapprott's lack of
counsel or a fair denaturalization trial to conclude that the absence of such procedures in denaturalizing a citizen justified the allowance of the "other reason" clause of
Rule 60(b). Id. The Court noted, however, that Rule 60(b)(6) should be utilized
only if such action was appropriate to accomplish justice. Id. at 609.
129 Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1497. Because Rule 9006(b) (1) did not have different standards for late motions as the years elapsed, Justice White reasoned that the excusable
neglect provision accommodated delays caused by Acts of God as well as neglect. Id.
at 1497-98. The Court asserted that "reading Rule 9006(b) (1) inflexibly to exclude
every instance of an inadvertent or negligent omission would ignore the most natural
meaning of the word 'neglect' and would be at odds with the accepted meaning of
the word in analogous contexts." Id. at 1498 (footnote omitted).
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After establishing a flexible excusable neglect standard, the
Court set forth the relevant factors for Rule 9006(b) (1) excusable
neglect determinations.1 3 0 Justice White explained that a lack of
congressional direction had resulted in a court-developed series of
equitable factors."' 1 These factors, the Court declared, included:
(1) whether the debtor would be unduly harmed; (2) whether the
late filing would impede the progress of the court; (3) whether the
late filer contributed to the delay and other facts behind the delay;
and (4) whether the creditor exhibited good faith in bringing the
132
motion.
The Court then applied these factors to the creditors' situation in the case at hand. 133 The majority pointed out that the Sixth
Circuit, while incorrectly distinguishing the creditors' actions from
their attorney's,1 3 4 nonetheless correctly found that the creditors'
situation warranted an excusable neglect filing extension.1 3 5 Referencing the factual findings from the Sixth Circuit, the PioneerCourt
agreed that the debtor would engender no harm from the late
proof of claim, the court schedule would be unaffected, and the
creditors had demonstrated good faith in their Rule 9006(b)(1)
motion.1 3 6 Justice White, examining the creditors' culpability, disId.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1991), afTfd,
113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993)).
133 Id. at 1499.
134 Id. The Court noted that the Sixth Circuit focused its analysis on whether the
creditors made an effort to monitor their attorney, rather than whether the creditors'
attorney "did all he reasonably could to comply with the court-ordered bar date." Id.
Justice White explained that, in many contexts, a client's fate is decided by his attorney's conduct. Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)). For
example, in Link v. Wabash R., the Court upheld a respondent's motion to dismiss a
lawsuit when the petitioner's attorney missed a scheduled pretrial conference. Link,
370 U.S. at 627-29, 633. The Court upheld the dismissal, stressing that clients freely
choose their representation and, therefore, must bear the burden of the consequences of their attorney's omissions. Id. at 633-34. Any other approach, the Court
declared, "would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation
. Id. (citation omitted).
See also United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 252, 253 (1985) (emphasizing that a
late tax filer would not be excused from delay because "reliance [upon an attorney]
cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute"). In
Boyle, the Court stressed that engaging an attorney for ordinary business does not
immunize the client from deadlines. Id. at 251.
135 Pioneer, 113 S.Ct. at 1499.
136 Id. at 1499. Justice White stressed that Pioneer did not contest the bankruptcy
court's findings that the creditors exhibited good faith, that judicial administration
would be unaffected by the late filings, and that Pioneer would not be prejudiced by
the late filing. Id. Furthermore, the Court preferred to allow the factual findings of
the bankruptcy court to stand because both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit
130
131
132

1993]

NOTE

1081

missed the attorney's personal woes as a factor, but declared that
the bankruptcy clerk's unusual notice form outweighed any of the
creditors' fault. 137 Finding that all of the equitable factors favored
the creditors, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Ap1 38
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, and
Thomas, dissented.1 3 9 Justice O'Connor declared that the plain
language of Rule 9006(b)(1) provided a sufficient excusable neglect definition, and that the majority's balancing test would improperly confuse future courts.140 The dissent immediately
presented a Rule 9006(b) (1) interpretation that dissected the
rule's language, creating a two-tiered test.14 1 A party seeking to file
a delayed claim under Rule 9006(b) (1), the dissent concluded,
must first demonstrate that the delay-causing actions constituted
excusable neglect. 142 Only after satisfying this threshold inquiry,
Justice O'Connor directed, could late claims be subjected to the
court's discretion in the second tier. 143 The dissent reasoned that
under this inquiry equitable considerations became a factor only
14
after the creditors demonstrated excusable neglect. 1
affirmed those findings. Id. (citation omitted). The majority also pointed to the
debtor's amended reorganization plan, which referenced the creditors' contested
claims, to evidence a lack of prejudice. Id. (citation omitted).
137 Id. The majority insisted that the notice form used in this case was extraordinary in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. Ordinarily, Justice White declared, the claims
bar date is announced with sufficient explanation in a letter distinct from the notice
announcing the creditor's meeting. Id. at 1499-1500 (citation omitted). Therefore,
the Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the bar date notification in a
creditor's meeting letter constituted a dramatic departure from normal bar date notification procedures. Id. at 1500 (citing In re Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 943 F.2d 673, 678
(6th Cir. 1991), afftd, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993)). Accordingly, the Court found that the
unusual notice form mailed to the creditors provided sufficient justification to warrant their neglect excusable. Id. But see Knocke, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that a
letter for the creditors' meeting is a "mine field of bar dates" that attorneys should
normally reference for claims bar dates).
138 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct at 1500. If there existed any bad faith by the creditors, any
impact upon judicial administration, or any prejudice to Pioneer, Justice White
stressed that the bankruptcy court would not have abused its discretion in finding no
excusable neglect. Id.
139 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140 Id. The dissenting Justice declared that the majority's opinion complicated a
"straightforward analysis commended by the language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) (1)
with a balancing test." Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. The Justice stressed that the delay must be "the result of excusable neglect."
Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKa. P. 9006(b)(1)).
143 Id. Again noting the rule's specific wording, the dissent emphasized that a court
"'may' grant relief 'in its discretion.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b) (1)).
144 Id. The dissent stressed that the effect of late filings on the parties was irrelevant
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After detailing the test, the dissent attacked the Court's flexible standard. 14 5 Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's multistep analysis that simultaneously addressed the creditor's culpability and the situation's equities. 4 6 The dissent referenced a Rule
6(b) case, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,14 7 to establish that
the majority incorrectly combined the two tiers of analysis.1 48 Justice O'Connor noted that the Lujan Court labelled excusable neglect as the greatest of substantive obstacles. 4 9 Accordingly, the
dissenting Justice perceived that excusable neglect merely constituted the initial step of Rule 9006(b) (1) motions. 50
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with Justice White's assertion
that Congress neglected to establish guideposts denoting the types
of excusable neglect. 5 1 Outlining these guideposts, the dissent
first referenced the wording of Rule 9006(b) (1), which indicated
that the relevant inquiry ignored the equitable consequences of a
late filing.1 52 Second,Justice O'Connor, quoting a legal dictionary,
until the reason for the missed deadline constituted excusable neglect. Id. at 1501
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (3d Cir.
1988)). In In re Vertientes, Ltd., the Third Circuit concluded that a "court simply has
no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for
any other equitable reason." Vertientes, 845 F.2d at 60 (citations omitted). Justice
O'Connor argued that excusable neglect is not considered "in light of all the circumstances." Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1500 (O'Connor, J, dissenting). Instead, the Justice
opined that "courts may exercise their discretion in accord with the equities only if the
failure to meet the deadlines resulted from excusable neglect in the first place." Id.
145 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146

Id.

487 U.S. 871 (1990).
Pioneer,113 S. Ct. at 1501 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
149 Id. In Lujan, the Supreme Court considered, without reference to the equities
of the situation, whether an untimely affidavit supporting a motion for summaryjudgment constituted a Rule 6(b) motion. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894-95, 897. Attempting to
decide whether the filing of affidavits after the deadline had expired constituted a
motion to extend a time limitation, the Lujan Court declared that any request to
extend a time limitation must be "for cause shown." Id. at 894-95, 896. Second, for a
post-deadline extension, the Court articulated, a party must show that an actual motion was made to extend the deadline. Id. at 896. Finally, the Court noted that a
party must demonstrate that the post-deadline delay resulted from excusable neglect.
Id. Referring to excusable neglect, the Court declared that "[t] his last substantive obstacle is the greatest of all." Id. at 897.
The Pioneermajority, however, disagreed with the importance the dissent attributed to Lujan. Pioneer, 113 S.Ct at 1498 n.13. Justice White asserted that the Lujan
court made no attempt to define excusable neglect or to examine the case's facts
under the excusable neglect doctrine. Id.
150 Pioneer, 113 S. Ct. at 1501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 Id. Refuting the majority, the dissentingJustice declared that "Congress has provided 'guideposts' as to how the courts should determine whether 'neglect will be
considered excusable.'" Id.
'
152 Id. The dissent centered its argument on the phrase " the failure to act was the
147
148
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opined that the accepted definition of excusable neglect formed a
dispositive guidepost.1 - 3 The majority's definition,' 54 the Justice
concluded, not only suffered from circularity,' 5 5 but also ignored
56
important aspects of Rule 9006(b)(1)'s language.'
Finally, the dissenting Justices declared that the majority unknowingly presented a third guidepost for Rule 9006(b) (1) -that
57
the rule should deter creditors from filing frivolous late motions.'
The dissent further maintained that Justice White erred by prematurely addressing equitable
considerations because this approach
15 8
would create confusion.
result'" of excusable neglect. Id. Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that the inquiry should be limited to the reasons for the late filing, rather than the effect upon
other parties. Id. at 1501-02 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover,
Justice O'Connor opined that whether a party's neglect was excusable should be determined at the time of its occurrence, rather than when an untimely action is requested. Id. at 1502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153 Id. The dissent quoted from BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY which provided that excusable neglect is:
[A] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard
of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or
unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by an adverse party. As used
inrule[s] (e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)) authorizing [a] court to permit an act
to be done after expiration of the time within which under the rules
such act was required to be done, where failure to act was the result of
'excusable neglect', quoted phrase is ordinarily understood to be the
act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990)). The dissenting Justice
then declared that the definition of excusable neglect turned on the reason for or the
cause of the delay and not on the consequences or results of such a failure. Id.
154 The majority defined excusable neglect to consider "the danger of prejudice to
the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings,
the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. at 1498 (citation omitted).
155 Id. at 1502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the majority's
test produced an interpretation in which "excusable neglect [would become] the neglect that the court in its equitable discretion [chose] to excuse." Id.
156 Id. The Justice opined that, under Justice White's multi-factor test, excusable
neglect would arise whenever courts exercised their equitable powers. Id. As a result,
Justice O'Connor claimed, the majority's definition ignored the word "excusable" and
allowed a court to decide, at its discretion, whether "neglect" alone sufficed. Id. Justice O'Connor also explained that the majority's interpretation of excusable neglect
"afforded courts [the] discretion to give relief in cases of 'neglect' rather than 'excusable neglect[.]'" Id.
157 Id. Deterrence would not be accomplished, the dissent reminded, by allowing
negligent creditors who missed a deadline to refer to an absence of prejudicial effects
as part of the Rule 9006(b)(1) test. Id. at 1502-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 1503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent remarked, for example, that
the majority's test had produced a split among the courts below. Id. Specifically,
Justice O'Connor referred to the decisions in which the bankruptcy court and the
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Turning to the case at bar, the dissenting Justices insisted that
Richards's actions could never constitute excusable neglect.' 59 Justice O'Connor claimed that because Richards's actions were
unexcusable, the majority's consideration of ancillary factors was
unnecessary.1 60 While agreeing with Justice White that creditors
must inherit their attorney's errors, the dissent declared that the
creditors could not attribute their delay to the irregular notice
form.' 6 1 The dissent concluded that the creditor's Rule
its standard, would not have wasted the
9006(b) (1) motion, under
16 2
court's valuable time.
Because the record may have been indeterminative concerning the effect of the filing deadline notice upon Richards's actions,
Justice O'Connor suggested that the Court should have remanded
the case for a conclusive factual finding. 163 The dissent also submitted that some negligent creditor actions could rise to the level
of excusable neglect.' Justice O'Connor reiterated, however, that
under the present facts, the creditors' indifference in failing to file
remained unexcusable under any standard.'6 5
district court had denied the filing extension under the Dix factors, while the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court had granted the motion. Id. See
id. at 1493-95 (discussing the procedural history of Pioneer).
159 Id. at 1503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160 Id. Justice O'Connor remarked that Richards's business difficulties at the time
were the only excuse for delay offered by the creditors. Id. The Justice also pointed
out that the creditors had notice of and were aware of the claims bar deadline. Id.
Contrary to the majority's opinion, the dissent maintained that the indifference
shown by the attorney exceeded mere negligence. Id.
161 Id. at 1503-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized heavily the
factual finding that indicated no clerical errors were present when the bankruptcy
court sent the meeting letter that contained the claims bar date. Id. The dissent
even reminded that Richards had stated "the foul-up I can't lay to the clients' shoes
because it is really probably mine." Id. at 1504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). The dissent stressed that the bankruptcy court never made a factual finding
that Richards missed the claims bar date as a result of the irregular meeting letter with
the filing deadline. Id. Moreover, Justice O'Connor explained, Richards himself had
never attributed the late filing to the unorthodox notice form. Id.
162

Id.

Id. Justice O'Connor suggested that if the unorthodox notice form had ultimately caused the delay, then the threshold inquiry might be satisfied. Id. Justice
O'Connor, however, refused to accept the majority's conclusion that Richards's failure to meet the extension deadline resulted from inadequate notice of that deadline.
Id. The dissent explained that the bankruptcy court should have determined whether
the irregular meeting notice form actually caused Richards to miss the deadline. Id.
Otherwise, the dissent directed, Richards's actions constituted indifference beyond
excusable neglect. Id.
164 Id. Justice O'Connor intimated that although "excusable neglect may cover
some instances of negligence, indifference [fell] outside the range of the 'excusable.'"
Id.
165 Id. As a result, the dissent refused to decide whether the bankruptcy court's
163
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Comparing their test with the majority's analysis, the dissent
predicted that the Court's standard would confuse courts and inspire appeals. 166 Justice O'Connor chided that the majority's test
transformed an excusable neglect motion from a routine matter to
a useless litigation breeder.1 6 7 Finally, the Justice warned that, because the majority's multi-factor test would invite appeals, creditors' claims to a debtor's limited resources would be reduced by
litigation fees." 6
Although the Pioneerdecision continues the recent pro-creditor trend in Supreme Court decisions, 169 the advantages a debtor
receives from filing a Chapter 11 petition clearly outweigh any benefits accruing to creditors as a result of thisjudicial trend.1 70 Fortunately, the majority's analysis comports with the reorganization
goal of Chapter 11.171 Furthermore, Justice White's opinion creates a necessary barrier between the dissimilar purposes of Chapter
11 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 72 Rule 9006(b)(1)
finding, which considered the equities of a late filing, passed an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. Justice O'Connor stressed that the dissent's two-tiered analysis rested
on factual decisions capable of review only under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. at
1505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Anticipating the dissent's unfavorable
comparison, Justice White criticized Justice O'Connor's reasoning. Id. at 1498 n.14.
Justice White asserted that any litigation possibilities that the majority's multi-factor
test might produce were no greater than the disputes the dissent's test would invite.
Id. Specifically, Justice White remarked that a legal dispute arising over the difference between "ordinary negligence" and "partial indifference" would be just as likely
to occur as one involving the factors of the majority's test. Id. The Court opined that
parties involved in a bankruptcy case would discover litigable issues regardless of the
number of excusable neglect factors because of the pecuniary interests involved. Id.
168 Id. at 1505 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
169 See CharlesJ. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act In The Supreme Court, 49 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 447, 566 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Reform Act decisions over the first ten years of the Act's existence have favored creditor's rights more
often than debtor's rights).
170 See id. (asserting that "[tihe bankruptcy laws have progressively become more
debtor oriented").
171 See id. at 560 (declaring that "[t]he policy of furthering the likelihood of an
effective reorganization under Chapter 11 has influenced the Court's decisions under
the [Bankruptcy Reform Act] more than any other policy"). For instance, Tabb noted
that in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, reorganization policy superseded the policy of
federal labor laws and the debtor employees' interests. Id. at 561 (citing NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525-29 (1984)). Moreover, the commentator
pointed out that in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., Chapter 11 reorganization superseded the policy of federal tax collection. Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983)).
172 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (1988) historical and revision notes legislative
statements (noting that Chapter 11 resulted from the need to consolidate the approach to business rehabilitation) with FED. R. Civ. P. (Preface) (The Foundation
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excusable neglect, although derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), could not logically retain interpretations stemming
from a rule promoting court efficiency. Procedural court rules
necessarily pertain to adversarial situations, while Chapter 11 envisions the amicable reorganization of a struggling business.1 7 A
Chapter 11 rule should not inherit the confrontational standards
of Rule 6(b).
Although the dissent's interpretation disputes the majority's
equitable formula, court discretion still remains as the second tier
of the dissent's suggested formula. 7 4 The excusable neglect standard did not acquire1 75newfound leniency in Pioneer, it merely received a refinement.
An insightful and appropriate set of guidelines, however, does
not guarantee uniform application. The prevalence of Chapter 11
filings ensures an abundance of future Rule 9006(b) (1) late claim
motions. 176 Initial decisions utilizing the Pioneer standard indicate
Press, Inc. 1989) (maintaining that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a
uniform procedure in civil actions that is simple, flexible, clear, and efficient).
173 See Frost, supranote 4, at 92 (noting that "[s] uccessful reorganizations are usually
characterized by negotiation rather than litigation") (footnote omitted). As one
scholar explained, bankrupt debtors prefer a broad discharge of obligations, liberal
exemptions of their assets from proceedings, and minimal payment obligations
whereas creditors strive for exactly the opposite results. Tabb, supra note 169, at 56566. Frost commented that Chapter 11 rules force debtors and creditors to operate
within the reorganization. Frost, supra note 4, at 92 (footnoted omitted). For instance, a bankruptcy petition produces an automatic stay against enforcement ofjudgments and collection of debts by creditors, forcing negotiations between the debtor
and creditors. Id. at 92 n.12.
174 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1500 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor declared that "at the threshold [the
court should] determine its authority to allow untimely action by asking whether the
failure to meet the deadline resulted from excusable neglect; if the answer is yes, then
the court should consider the equities and decide whether to excuse the error." Id.
The PioneerCourt presented a multi-factor test which included
175 See id. at 1498.
the following considerations: prejudice to the debtor, impact on court administration,
reason for the delay, and good faith of the creditor. Id. The Dix test encompassed
substantially the same considerations except that the Ninth Circuit also examined
whether clients should be penalized for their attorney's mistake. Id. at 1493 (quoting
In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988)).
176 See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1049 (noting that "[iln the wake of
the 1978 [Bankruptcy Reform] Act the frequency of corporate bankruptcy filings has
increased dramatically"). For a discussion of possible problems with the Pioneerdecision, see Frank W. Koger & Roy B. True, The FinalWord On Excusable Neglect?, 98 COMMERCIAL L.J., 21, 24, 30-31 (1993) (positing that both the Pioneer majority and dissent
failed to recognize the applicability of Rule 9006(b) (1) to Chapter 7 liquidations).
Koger and True contended that Bankruptcy Rules 3004 and 3005 provided a mechanism in which debtors and third parties could file claims on behalf of creditors in a
Chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at 31; see also In re Davis, 935 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1991)
(considering an excusable neglect extension where debtor attempted to file a proof
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177
uncertainty and even reluctance towards the multi-step analysis.
The majority's test, therefore, could conceivably escalate the current circuit court confusion.
The recent retirement ofJustice Byron R. White, 1 78 who wrote
the 5-4 Pioneeropinion, further complicates excusable neglect application because the Court is deadlocked on any future interpretations of the issue until Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 179 presents her
position. Moreover, the scope ofJustice White's standard requires
focusing. The Pioneermajority maintained that excusable neglect
included situations within and beyond a creditor's control.1 80 Justice White also suggested, however, that creditors must satisfy all
four of the Pioneertest components to receive a filing extension. 1 81

of claim on behalf of the IRS). Koger and True noted, however, that Rule 9006(b) (2)
and (3), the provisions governing when time extensions may or may not be permitted,
did not preclude application of the excusable neglect standard to Rules 3004 and
3005. Koger & True, supra, at 31. See supra note 11 (detailing the language of Bankruptcy Rules 9006(b)(2) and 9006(b)(3)). Accordingly, the commentators concluded that the Pioneerdecision failed to address situations where a Chapter 7 debtor
will try to assert excusable neglect. Koger & True, supra, at 34.
177 See, e.g., In re Earth Rock, Inc., 153 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993) ("Applying the various factors mentioned in Pioneer Investment to the facts of this case makes
for a truly difficult decision for the [c]ourt."). Although another court recently followed the Pioneerexcusable neglect considerations, the court declared that it was "by
no means... limited to" these inquiries because the analysis has an equitable foundation. In re R.H. Macy & Co., No. 92B40477 (BRL), 1993 WL 195408, at *2 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1993). Furthermore, an Oklahoma bankruptcy court, exhibiting a
lack of confidence in the Pioneer majority, also examined a Rule 9006(b) (1) motion
under the dissent's two-tiered analysis. In re Maps Int'l, Inc., 152 B.R. 989, 993
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993).
In In re Earth Rock, a creditor of a Chapter 11 debtor filed a proof of claim filing
extension. Earth Rock, 153 B.R. at 61-62. The creditor's attorney advised the creditor
that the debtor's continued payments under a subcontractor's contract precluded the
need to file for a proof of claim. Id. at 62. As the Chapter 11 proceeding progressed,
the claims deadline passed, and the creditor filed its proof of claim eight months past
the deadline. Id. at 63. Although the bankruptcy court found no prejudice to the
debtor or any delay in reorganization proceedings, it declared that the eight month
delay evidenced a lack of diligence by the creditors. Id. The court conceded that it
faced a close call, but allowed the filing extension because it would have served little
interest to deprive the creditor participation in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 64.
178 Linda Greenhouse, Court Questions Districts Drawn To Aid Minorities, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 29, 1993, at Al. Justice White served his final day on the Supreme Court bench
on June 28, 1993. Id.
179 On June 14, 1993, President Bill Clinton announced the appointment of Federal Court of Appeals Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to replace Justice White on the
Supreme Court. Thomas L. Friedman, The 11th Hour Scramble, N.Y. TimEs, June 15,
1993, at Al.
180 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct 1489, 1495 (1993).
181 Id. at 1500. Although the Court noted that the extraordinary notice of the
deadline was outside of the creditor's control, Justice White intimated that "were
there any evidence of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration of this case,
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As a result, this new, flexible approach may, in reality, be stricter
than before.
For example, as the test now stands, a creditor may file a tardy
claim due to circumstances beyond its control. 1 82 Such a claim,
however, may also simultaneously prejudice the debtor and delay
court administration. Under the strict interpretation, which allowed an extension when the delay was beyond the creditor's control, an extension would have been granted. 8 Under Pioneer,
however, this hypothetical would not satisfy all of the majority's factors for Rule 9006(b) (1) excusable neglect, and an extension
would be denied." 4 The present court, therefore, must prescribe
when a creditor's conduct deserves the test's equitable assistance
and when it does not.18 5 A consistently applied Pioneer standard
will deter undeserving creditors and facilitate Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Richard P. Tobin

or any indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy Court
abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect excusable." Id. at 1499-1500.
182 Id. at 1494.
183 See id. at 1494 n.3 (citations omitted).
184 See id. at 1500.
185 Cf David A. Riggi, The Supreme Court, in a Bankruptcy Law Decision Stretches the
"ElasticConcept" of "ExcusableNeglect" NEVADA LAwYER, May, 1993, at 20. Riggi asserted
that the Supreme Court's flexible approach may breed much litigation when applied
to the facts of each case. Id. Although the Pioneerdecision was well-reasoned, Riggi
also argued that it may produce unwarranted appeals. Id. at 20, 24.

